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Richard Layard explains the Manifesto for Economic Sense
Thousands of  economists disagree with the austerity policies being f ollowed in so many
countries. Yet f ew speak out and I am one of  the guilty ones. That is why Paul Krugman
and I have now written a ‘Manif esto f or Economic Sense’ which is reprinted below. We
hope this will be signed by thousands of  economists. More importantly, we hope that they
will use the arguments in the Manif esto to engage in vigorous debate worldwide about
how to emerge f rom the current stagnation.
As the Manif esto explains, the stagnation is not due to f iscal def icits. It ’s the other way
round: the def icits are due to the stagnation. Fiscal contraction to reduce those def icits can only slow
down the recovery. The view that it will ‘restore conf idence’ was never plausible in the light of  history and
its emptiness once again stares us in the f ace.
So we hope that as many LSE graduates as possible will sign our Manif esto at
www.manif estof oreconomicsense.org and please proclaim its arguments f rom the housetops.
A Manifesto for Economic Sense
More than f our years af ter the f inancial crisis began, the world’s major advanced economies remain
deeply depressed, in a scene all too reminiscent of  the 1930s. And the reason is simple: we are relying on
the same ideas that governed policy in the 1930s. These ideas, long since disproved, involve prof ound
errors both about the causes of  the crisis, its nature, and the appropriate response.
These errors have taken deep root in public consciousness and provide the public support f or the
excessive austerity of  current f iscal policies in many countries. So the time is ripe f or a Manif esto in
which mainstream economists of f er the public a more evidence-based analysis of  our problems.
The causes. Many policy makers insist that the crisis was caused by irresponsible public
borrowing. With very f ew exceptions – other than Greece – this is f alse. Instead, the conditions f or
crisis were created by excessive private sector borrowing and lending, including by over- leveraged
banks. The collapse of  this bubble led to massive f alls in output and thus in tax revenue. So the
large government def icits we see today are a consequence of  the crisis, not its cause.
The nature of the crisis. When real estate bubbles on both sides of  the Atlantic burst, many
parts of  the private sector slashed spending in an attempt to pay down past debts. This was a
rational response on the part of  individuals, but – just like the similar response of  debtors in the
1930s – it has proved collectively self -def eating, because one person’s spending is another
person’s income. The result of  the spending collapse has been an economic depression that has
worsened the public debt.
The appropriate response. At a t ime when the private sector is engaged in a collective ef f ort
to spend less, public policy should act as a stabilizing f orce, attempting to sustain spending. At the
very least we should not be making things worse by big cuts in government spending or big
increases in tax rates on ordinary people. Unf ortunately, that’s exactly what many governments are
now doing.
The big mistake. Af ter responding well in the f irst, acute phase of  the economic crisis,
conventional policy wisdom took a wrong turn – f ocusing on government def icits, which are mainly
the result of  a crisis- induced plunge in revenue, and arguing that the public sector should attempt
to reduce its debts in tandem with the private sector. As a result, instead of  playing a stabilizing
role, f iscal policy has ended up reinf orcing the dampening ef f ects of  private-sector spending cuts.
In the f ace of  a less severe shock, monetary policy could take up the slack. But with interest rates close
to zero, monetary policy – while it should do all it  can – cannot do the whole job. There must of  course
be a medium-term plan f or reducing the government def icit. But if  this is too f ront- loaded it can easily be
self -def eating by aborting the recovery. A key priority now is to reduce unemployment, bef ore it becomes
endemic, making recovery and f uture def icit reduction even more dif f icult.
How do those who support present policies answer the argument we have just made? They use two
quite dif f erent arguments in support of  their case.
The confidence argument. Their f irst argument is that government def icits will raise interest rates and
thus prevent recovery. By contrast, they argue, austerity will increase conf idence and thus encourage
recovery.
But there is no evidence at all in f avour of  this argument. First, despite exceptionally high def icits,
interest rates today are unprecedentedly low in all major countries where there is a normally f unctioning
central bank. This is true even in Japan where the government debt now exceeds 200% of  annual GDP;
and past downgrades by the rating agencies here have had no ef f ect on Japanese interest rates.
Interest rates are only high in some Euro countries, because the ECB is not allowed to act as lender of
last resort to the government. Elsewhere the central bank can always, if  needed, f und the def icit, leaving
the bond market unaf f ected.
Moreover past experience includes no relevant case where budget cuts have actually generated
increased economic activity. The IMF has studied 173 cases of  budget cuts in individual countries and
f ound that the consistent result is economic contraction. In the handf ul of  cases in which f iscal
consolidation was f ollowed by growth, the main channels were a currency depreciation against a strong
world market, not a current possibility. The lesson of  the IMF’s study is clear – budget cuts retard
recovery. And that is what is happening now – the countries with the biggest budget cuts have
experienced the biggest f alls in output.
For the truth is, as we can now see, that budget cuts do not inspire business conf idence. Companies will
only invest when they can f oresee enough customers with enough income to spend. Austerity
discourages investment.
So there is massive evidence against the conf idence argument; all the alleged evidence in f avor of  the
doctrine has evaporated on closer examination.
The structural argument. A second argument against expanding demand is that output is in f act
constrained on the supply side – by structural imbalances. If  this theory were right, however, at least
some parts of  our economies ought to be at f ull stretch, and so should some occupations. But in most
countries that is just not the case. Every major sector of  our economies is struggling, and every
occupation has higher unemployment than usual. So the problem must be a general lack of  spending and
demand.
In the 1930s the same structural argument was used against proactive spending policies in the U.S. But
as spending rose between 1940 and 1942, output rose by 20%. So the problem in the 1930s, as now,
was a shortage of  demand not of  supply.
As a result of  their mistaken ideas, many Western policy-makers are inf licting massive suf f ering on their
peoples. But the ideas they espouse about how to handle recessions were rejected by nearly all
economists af ter the disasters of  the 1930s, and f or the f ollowing f orty years or so the West enjoyed
an unparalleled period of  economic stability and low unemployment. It is tragic that in recent years the old
ideas have again taken root. But we can no longer accept a situation where mistaken f ears of  higher
interest rates weigh more highly with policy-makers than the horrors of  mass unemployment.
Better policies will dif f er between countries and need detailed debate. But they must be based on a
correct analysis of  the problem. We theref ore urge all economists and others who agree with the broad
thrust of  this Manif esto to register their agreement at www.manif estof oreconomicsense.org, and to
publically argue the case f or a sounder approach. The whole world suf f ers when men and women are
silent about what they know is wrong.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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